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ABSTRACT 
Cooperative environments where multiple organizations interact for 
providing e-services to their customers are widely diffused and often 
referred as virtual enterprises. IT systems supporting these 
inter-organizational models must be designed by taking into account both 
functional and non-functional issues. Among the non-functional issues, 
information security solutions play an important role as mechanisms for 
reinforcing trust among members of a virtual enterprise and their supplier/ 
customers. In this paper, we outline a set of non-functional requirements for 
IT systems supporting virtual enterprises, and describe the federated identity 
management system which has been implemented in the context of an EU 
project (LD-CAST) as an example of a trust-reinforcing mechanism.  
Keywords: Digital Platform, Identity Management Systems, Virtual 
Enterprise, Circle of Trust 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing needs for complex products and services in competitive 
markets require new cooperative models based on networked forms 
individuals, communities and organizations. In this context, the 
interoperability of systems and organizations, enabled by standards and 
technologies, represents a central requirement towards flexibility, a strategic 
International Journal of Electronic Commerce Studies 328 
attribute for competitive organizations
1
. Several contributions in the 
organizational literature identify virtual enterprises as innovative 
configurations able to increase the benefits of inter-organizational 
cooperation 
2
.  
A Virtual Enterprise (VE) can be defined as a “temporary organization 
of companies that come together to share costs and skills to address business 
opportunities that they could not undertake individually”3. In other words, it 
is a temporary alliance of (usually small and medium sized) enterprises that 
join together to share skills or core competencies and resources in order to 
better respond to business opportunities, and whose cooperation is 
supported by computer and communication networks
4
. Thus a VE can be 
considered as a weakly-connected system where participants define their 
actions independently in order to achieve a common goal
5
, and participant 
cooperation is supported by computer networks
6, 7, 8
. Moreover, when the 
business opportunity terminates, the units leave the network and give rise to 
new forms of organizations.  
The main obstacles to the development of VEs have been identified in 
the limits of their supporting cooperation platforms, and in the inefficiency 
of their organizational configurations. Furthermore, there is a lack of 
mechanisms aimed to increase trust and security in these online settings
9, 10
. 
More generally, a critical element in the implementation process of 
inter-organizational systems is represented by the identification of 
information to be shared and their quality characteristics. Among these 
characteristics, information security plays a crucial role as the enabler of 
trust
11, 12, 13
, which is particularly needed when ownership relations among 
partners are lacking, and a strong integration is required
14, 15, 16, 17, 18
. In 
particular, we refer here to the concept of “systemic trust” which has been 
introduced by Sztompka
19
 as the combination of institutional, technological 
and commercial trust. 
Previous conceptual works have focused on the role of federated 
identity management systems as trust-reinforcing mechanisms when 
multiple organizations need to cooperate
12, 20, 21
. These security solutions are 
based on a combination of several technical, administrative, and informal 
aspects in order to ensure the expected benefits
9
. They represent an 
alternative to the most common centralized architectures which pose a 
number of issues when access control is needed across organizational 
boundaries.  
In this paper, we aim to explore the characteristics of trust-reinforcing 
mechanisms in the context of virtual enterprises. Furthermore, we aim to 
understand to what extent federated identity management systems represent 
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a suitable solution to security issues in this domain. Our empirical analysis 
is based on a case study
22
 performed on a research project (LD-CAST) for 
the development of a cooperation framework supporting the provision of 
cross-border e-services. 
The LD-CAST (Local Development Cooperation Action Enabled by 
Semantic Technology) project has been funded by the European 
Commission by involving as service providers the Chambers of Commerce 
from four different countries, and as members of the consortium, one 
university, two research centers and three IT system integrators. The 
ultimate goal of the research project has been to define a cooperation 
framework, and to develop a prototype of the supporting semantic platform. 
Both types of results have been validated in the last phase of the project, and 
they were approved by the EU Commission in 2008. For the purposes of 
this paper, we refer to data collected during the 30 months of the project in 
the form of official documents, meeting minutes, interviews, and direct 
observations. In fact, both authors have been directly involved in project 
activities.  
In the following sections we first outline the LD-CAST platform 
non-functional requirements, which address security issues. Then, we 
provide an overview of the choices that have been made in the design of the 
platform architecture, with a particular reference to the federated identity 
management subsystem. Finally, we suggest possible generalization of our 
findings together with implications for research and practice.  
2. SECURITY ISSUES AND NON-FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
Before detailing the non-functional requirements identified in the 
LD-CAST project, we briefly introduce the security issues that have 
emerged during the project. In order to present these requirements, we refer 
to the ISO 17799 standard which is widely recognized as a de facto standard 
for describing good practices in information security processing
23, 24
. This 
standard enlists the various aspects that must be taken into account for 
managing information systems security, and organizations are requested to 
select the controls that fit with their security needs. By referring to the area 
of “Access control”, a set of 7 objectives and 25 controls are described in 
the standard. Among these, the following objectives have been considered 
as applicable to the LD-CAST platform by the project consortium:  
 Business requirements for access control: user’s access to information, 
and to business processes should be controlled on the basis of business 
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and security requirements. This should take into account policies for 
information dissemination and authorization.  
 User access management: formal procedures should be in place to 
control the allocation of access rights to information systems and 
services. The procedures should cover all stages in the life-cycle of 
user access, from the initial registration of new users, to the final 
de-registration of users who no longer require access to information 
systems and services.  
 Network access control: access to both internal and external networked 
services should be controlled. This is necessary to ensure that users 
who have access to networks and network services do not compromise 
the security of these network services by ensuring: appropriate 
interfaces between the organization’s network and networks owned by 
other organizations, or public networks; appropriate authentication 
mechanisms for users and equipment; and, control of user access to 
information services. 
2.1 LD-CAST Non-Functional Requirements 
In the LD-CAST case, the above-mentioned objectives have been 
translated in the requirements and therefore in procedural and architectural 
design choices. The first objective (business requirements for access control) 
can be achieved through a formal agreement among partners and through a 
set of authorization rules defined by each member providing services or 
information. The second objective (user access management) asks for a set 
of formal procedures, and a technical system to manage user credentials. 
This can be achieved using a centralized or a decentralized approach, 
depending on the system architecture. Finally, the third objective (network 
access control) asks for a set of mechanisms to control user access to the 
network. In this case, a decentralized approach presents the advantage of 
leaving the choice of an appropriate technical solution for access control and 
monitoring to each identity provider. With these premises, the following 
non functional requirements have been defined for the LD-CAST platform: i) 
identity management requirements: since legal issues arise in centralizing 
information about users, a decentralized approach for the management of 
user’s data is required; ii) identification requirements: different mechanisms 
(i.e. digital certificates, smart card, certified e-mail message or face-to-face) 
are accepted to complete the registration phase, by different Local Agencies 
(i.e. Chambers of Commerce). Each Local Agency should be in charge of 
the identification of its own registered users; iii) authentication requirements: 
a Single-Sign-On mechanism should be provided to users accessing the 
overall LD-CAST system. Authentication should be based on username and 
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password; iv) authorization mechanism: depending on the rules and policies 
of each service provider, an authorization mechanism for executing services 
and activities should be defined. 
Discussion among LD-CAST partners has led to the decision of 
adopting a federated identity management system. This technology has been 
seen as an alternative to the most common centralized solutions supporting 
the online cooperation of different organizations. Moreover, in order to also 
satisfy compliance requirements with privacy regulations, project partners 
have also investigated innovative solutions by analyzing and comparing the 
results of other recent EU-funded research projects (i.e. FIDIS, PRIME, 
etc.). Therefore, the choice of implementing a federated identity 
management system has been made also in accordance with this additional 
requirement.  
3. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 
Before describing how the above-mentioned requirements have 
influenced the LD-CAST architectural choices, we introduce the main 
characteristics of federated identity management systems. In the context of 
identity management systems, the term “subject” refers to an entity, 
typically a user or a device, which needs to authenticate itself in order to be 
allowed to access a resource. Subjects then interact with authentication 
systems of various types at various sources. An authentication type is the 
method the subject uses to authenticate itself (i.e. by providing user ID and 
password). An authentication source is the authority that controls the 
authentication data and protocol. Authentication takes place both within an 
organization, and among multiple organizations. Even within an 
organization, there may be multiple sources. However, traditional 
authentication systems generally presume a single authentication source and 
type. An example is given by Kerberos
25
, in which the source is a trusted 
Key Distribution Center (KDC) and the type is user IDs with passwords. In 
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the source is the Certification Authority 
(CA) and the type is challenge/response. While both Kerberos and PKI 
permit multiple authentication sources, these authentication sources must be 
closely coupled. Often, complex trust relationships must be established and 
maintained among the sources of authentication. This can lead to 
authentication solutions that are operationally infeasible and economically 
cost-prohibitive. 
A practical view of inter-organizational communications reveals that 
having a single type of authentication is a rare possibility. In fact, the 
involved organizations will be supporting multiple authentication types, 
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such as passwords, tokens, certificates, and smart cards. Therefore, security 
architectures should include a single infrastructure for managing all of these 
types, rather than a separate infrastructure for each of them. In this practical 
model, the many authentication sources form a federation, where each 
member of the federation can ascertain the authenticity of a set of subjects. 
In this context, the term “federated” refers to multiple authentication 
types and sources. The pre-condition for the implementation of a federated 
identity management system is the existence of a “circle of trust”, defined as 
a group of organizations that have established trusted relationships and have 
pertinent agreements in place regarding how to interact with each other, and 
how to manage user identities. Once a subject has been authenticated by an 
identity provider within a circle of trust, this subject will be easily 
recognized by the other service providers within the same circle of trust.  
3.1 The Ld-Cast Architecture 
During the design phase of the LD-CAST project, the Liberty Alliance 
project was identified as a possible answer to the above-mentioned 
requirements. The Liberty Alliance project was aimed to foster the 
development of standards and specifications for federated identity systems. 
For example, the Liberty specifications provide mechanisms for single 
sign-on, and for linking separate accounts within a group of service 
providers in a circle of trust. 
Such an architecture allows users to sign in only one time during the 
session, and it enables interactions with any service provider or identity 
provider in the circle of trust without any other login operation until the next 
logout. Moreover, the user’s registration data are gathered only by the 
identity provider chosen by each user, with obvious advantages in terms of 
privacy concerns. 
Hence, in the LD-CAST case this federated identity management 
architecture has been implemented by considering that the final user (i.e. the 
entrepreneur) interacts with service providers (i.e. a foreign Chamber of 
Commerce) by performing the authentication process with his/her own 
identity provider (i.e. the local Chamber of Commerce to which s/he is 
registered). All of these interactions are made possible by the agreement 
among all the actors involved that become members of the above-mentioned 
circle of trust. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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Organizations around the world protect access to sensitive or important 
information through the use of access control rules. In every electronic 
transaction context, such as in the LD-CAST case, identity management 
solutions play a key role within the mechanisms for reinforcing trust. In this 
paper we have shown that federated identity management systems represent 
a possible architectural solution to change the way consumers, businesses, 
and the government performs online authentication and authorization. The 
LD-CAST case confirms the hypothesis that federated identity management 
systems fit with non-functional requirements related to security issues. In 
fact, the above-mentioned concept of circle of trust and the Liberty Alliance 
architectural specifications also seem to fit well with the LD-CAST 
non-functional requirements. In particular, this architectural solution allows 
to tightly couple together the three basic interactions between the user, his 
or her identity provider (i.e. the local Chamber of Commerce), and a generic 
service provider, during the authentication and authorization process. These 
three basic interactions are i) the user authentication; ii) the access request; 
and, iii) the delivery of authorization attributes from the identity provider 
towards the service provider.  
According with the case study research strategy, the main contribution 
of this study is based on the possibility to analytically generalize the 
LD-CAST findings. In fact, the group of local agencies providing 
cross-border G2B e-services through the LD-CAST platform can be 
considered as an instantiation of a virtual enterprise, whereas identity 
management systems represent an instantiation of a trust-reinforcing 
mechanism. Federated identity management systems have confirmed their 
role as a possible alternative to the most commonly centralized solutions 
when supporting the online cooperation of multiple organizations. 
Furthermore, the LD-CAST non-functional requirements can be generalized 
in order to derive access control requirements for IT systems supporting 
virtual enterprises. These contributions have several implications for 
practitioners involved in the design of such IT systems.  
However, since the LD-CAST project goal was to provide a proof of 
concept of the implemented technological solution, our data do not include 
any information on the real behavior of the virtual enterprise. At the same 
time, this represents a limitation of our work, and an opportunity for further 
research in this field. Moreover, since the relationship between network 
behavior, security and trust goes beyond the scope of the present paper, we 
also consider this as a possible direction for developing future investigations 
in this domain through empirical studies and simulation models
26, 27
.  
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